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Abstract 
Food aid has been used to promote economic development, but mostly it is used to alleviate food 
shortages. At any given time, weather-related and human-made disasters (such as civil strife and 
post conflict repercussions) create a demand for food aid.  Recent analysis suggests that needs 
outpace the availability of such aid.  The United States dominates the international food aid 
system, providing more than half of all food assistance, and its actions have a major influence on 
other donors and the system as a whole.  The 50
th anniversary of the U.S. food aid program in 
2004 is a timely point to appraise, offer a retrospective of past issues, and reexamine plans for 
the future.  The purpose of this paper is to examine the evolution of the U.S. food aid program 
and to review the recipients of U.S. food aid.   In addition, the criteria for allocating food aid are 
evaluated quantitatively.  Cross-country regression analysis is performed looking at food aid as a 
function of several factors including the recipient countries’ political situation, production 
shocks, trade balance, and income level. The preliminary results show that food aid distribution 
is based not only on U.S. political and trade interests but also on the recipient countries' 
economic conditions.  The estimation results indicate growing consideration of the recipients' 
needs in U.S. food aid transfers over time. 
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Introduction 
Food aid has been used to promote economic development, but mostly it is used to alleviate food 
shortages. At any given time, weather-related and human-made disasters (such as civil strife and 
post conflict repercussions) create a demand for food aid.  The number of complex emergencies 
requiring humanitarian assistance for refugees and displaced persons is growing.  Recent 
analysis suggests that food aid needs outpace the availability of such aid.  
 
The United States dominates the international food aid system, providing more than half of all 
food assistance, and its actions have a major influence on other donors and the system as a 
whole. Management of the U.S. food aid program has become complicated because of the wide 
range of objectives. While all international donors cite humanitarian relief as their basic 
motivation, economic and political considerations also influence allocation.  The commodity mix 
of food aid usually reflects the export profile of the donor country and tends to vary with yearly 
fluctuations in the availability of food aid.  Hence, while food aid clearly helps preserve lives 
during food emergencies, the current patterns of supply and distribution are in many cases not 
targeted in terms of timing and quantities required for those most in need.   
 
Several factors make this an opportune time to review U.S. food aid programs.  Eight years have 
passed since the World Food Summit in 1996 when the United States and more than 180 other 
countries pledged to cut the number of hungry people in half by 2015.  While some progress in 
countries such as India and China has been made, for other countries a continuation of current 
trends would not meet the goal.  Food security has also come to the forefront in agricultural trade 
negotiations.  Developing countries have raised the issue as a concern because trade  
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liberalization is likely to increase food prices and thereby possibly limit their ability to import 
food.  These countries have proposed some type of international financial reserve to support food 
imports. In addition, all donors' food aid programs have faced criticism over the fact that they 
interfere with global food markets.  
 
The 50
th anniversary of the U.S. food aid program in 2004 is a timely point to appraise, offer a 
retrospective of past issues, and reexamine plans for the future.  The U.S. Action Plan on Food 
Security, released in March 1999, outlines policies and actions aimed at alleviating hunger at 
home and abroad.  In order to improve the effectiveness of the international food assistance 
program, the Action Plan places priority on the most food insecure countries.   
 
The purpose of this paper is to examine the evolution of the U.S. food aid program and to review 
the recipients of U.S. food aid.  In addition, the criteria for allocating food aid are evaluated 
quantitatively.  Cross-country regression analysis is performed looking at food aid as a function 
of several factors including the recipient countries’ political situation, production shocks, trade 
balance, and income level. 
 
  Forces Shaping U.S. Food Aid Policy 
The current U.S. food aid budget is allocated among countries based on a mix of political and 
humanitarian objectives.  Over time, the focus of food aid programs has shifted from surplus 
disposal to humanitarian purposes.  U.S. food aid programs have served domestic agriculture by 
providing an outlet for surplus commodities, by being a promotion tool for stimulating export 
market demand, and by providing general support for U.S. foreign policy objectives.  Food aid  
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also served as an humanitarian instrument allowing countries with import constraints to reduce 
their import costs, stimulate their economic development by using food aid to finance projects, 
and most important of all provide consumption support during emergencies.  
 
The U.S. food aid program was initiated in the early 1950s.  The legislation for food aid followed 
the enactment of the Agricultural Trade Development and Assistance Act of 1954 (P.L. 480). Its 
objectives are carried out under three broad programs: 
•  Title I authorizes commodity sales under long-term loans to be repaid in local 
currency.  Those currencies could be used for the recipient country's economic 
development, market development, payments of U.S. obligations, and purchases 
of goods and services from other countries. 
•  Title II provides food as a grant for emergency relief. 
•  Title III authorizes food donations to private voluntary organizations (PVO's) to 
distribute domestically or to needy countries (1977 amendment). 
During the 1970s, commercial demand for U.S. grains increased dramatically, resulting in higher 
prices and reduced stocks.  The volume of food aid fell in 1974 to its lowest level since the 
enactment of P.L. 480.  During the 1980s, increased U.S. grain stocks did not translate into 
increased food aid expenditures. To reduce stocks and increase U.S. competitiveness, the U.S. 
adopted a targeted export subsidy program entitled the Export Enhancement program.  
 
The 1990 Food, Agriculture, Conservation, and Trade Act (FACT) changed the structure of food 
aid programs by emphasizing economic development and humanitarian goals.  The managerial 
authority for Title I was given to the U.S. Department of Agriculture, and Title II and Title III  
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(humanitarian programs) were assigned to the U.S. Agency for International Development.  In 
1991, for the first time since the start of U.S. food aid programs, the largest share of the P.L. 480 
budget was allocated to Title II to support humanitarian concerns. The end of the Cold War 
added more countries to the list of food aid recipients.  Food aid was given to East European and 
Central Asian countries for political and emergency reasons stemming from civil strife and to 
signal political goodwill.  
 
U.S. Continues to Dominate Global Food Aid Donations 
Total food aid from all sources averaged about 9.5 million tons during the 1970s.  In the early 
1980s, food aid shipments fell slightly below the 1974 World Food Conference goal of 10 
million tons.  By the mid-1980s, large grain stocks in most donor countries enabled them to 
increase food aid donations and respond to the East African food crisis.  While the grain share of 
total food aid remains large, it has declined over time: from 100 percent through the mid-1970s, 
to roughly 90 percent in the early 1990s, and to about 85 percent in the early 2000s.  In recent 
years, wheat and wheat products have accounted for approximately 60 percent of this grain aid.  
During the last decade, pulses and vegetable oils have generally comprised more than 80 percent 
of non-grain aid. 
 
The major donors of food aid are the United States, the European Union (EU), Canada, Japan, 
and Australia.  In the late 1980s, the United States provided 57 percent of all food aid, followed 
by the EU with 25 percent and Canada with nearly 8 percent.  The U.S. share of global food aid 
declined to its lowest level, 47 percent, in the mid 1990s.  This drop was compensated for by the 
EU, whose share rose to 35 percent, and Japan, whose share jumped significantly at this time to  
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nearly 6 percent.  Major changes in EU agricultural policies led to increased grain production, 
and the EU evolved from a net grain importer to a net exporter.  EU food aid shipments peaked 
at more than 5 million tons in 1992.  EU grain stocks peaked around this same time.  In the early 
2000s, the U.S. share rebounded, averaging roughly 62 percent.  The EU share fell sharply to 17 
percent as their grain stocks reverted to the levels of the early 1980s.  Canada’s share followed a 
similar path, equaling only 2.4 percent in 2000-02.  Japan’s share remained fairly steady at 5.6 
percent. 
 
From 1954 to 1963, food aid accounted for more than half of U.S. grain exports.  With the 
reduction in grain surpluses in the 1970s, the quantities of food aid allocated declined from a 
peak of 17 million tons (1965-66) to a low of 2.5 million tons in 1974, indicating a high 
correlation between food aid program support and surplus grain production in this period.  In 
recent years, the quantity of U.S. food aid has remained at 5 to 6 million tons, while its share in 
U.S. grain exports has declined significantly from more than half to about 7 percent of exports.  
 
  Who Are the Recipients of U.S. Food Aid? 
In the late 1980s, Asia (defined as East, South, and Southeast Asia) was the largest recipient of 
U.S. food aid, with a share averaging roughly 27 percent.  The shares held by Latin America and 
the Caribbean (LAC) and North Africa were slightly smaller, each receiving about a quarter of 
the U.S. total.  Egypt was by far the largest single recipient, holding a 17-percent share.  This 
allocation decision clearly reflected U.S. political concerns rather than neediness based on 
nutritional concerns of the country.  Sub-Saharan Africa (SSA), which comprised of some of the 
most nutritionally vulnerable countries, received an equal share of U.S. food aid as Egypt.    
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By the mid-1990s, SSA was the largest recipient, with a share of more than 30 percent.  Asia’s 
share dropped to less than 20 percent, while LAC’s share fell considerably to around 10 percent.  
North Africa received negligible amounts of food aid at this time as the food aid program to 
Egypt virtually disappeared after 1992.  This change in the allocation decisions—with Asia and 
SSA receiving larger shares of the food aid and LAC and North Africa receiving smaller 
shares—reflects the shift in the U.S. food aid policy toward humanitarian concerns.   
 
Another important development at this time was the allocation to the countries of the former 
Soviet Union and Eastern Europe.  With the end of the Cold War and the downfall of the Soviet 
Bloc, new sovereign countries emerged that embarked on transforming into market economies.  
This transformation process caused a temporary contraction of their GDP and an increase in 
poverty rates.  Among the countries receiving sizeable food aid donations were: Russia, Georgia, 
Tajikistan, Kyrgyzstan, Serbia and Montenegro, Bosnia-Herzegovina, and Moldova.  The shift 
toward helping these transition countries reflected a desire to support nascent market economies.  
In 1993, the Soviet Bloc countries received more than half of U.S. food aid—Russia’s share 
alone was nearly 32 percent.   
 
In 2000-02, food aid to this region fell dramatically as their economies strengthened.  Their share 
of U.S. food aid averaged roughly 13 percent per year during this time.  LAC received virtually 
the same level of food aid as the former Soviet and Eastern European countries.  SSA was once 
again the largest recipient of aid—holding a 34-percent share.   The share of U.S. food aid  
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headed to the Asian countries rebounded to roughly 23 percent as shipments to Indonesia, North 
Korea, and the Philippines were significantly higher than they had been in the mid 1990s. 
 
Determinants of U.S. Food Aid Allocation 
The close relationship between food aid and foreign interests of the United States has been 
evident throughout the history of the food aid programs.  Distribution policies include 
humanitarian concerns as well as domestic economic and political interests.  In this study, we 
used several indicators to represent these wide-ranging objectives.  The estimation of allocation 
of food aid to recipient countries is based on cross-country multiple linear regressions using 
1990, 1995, and 2000 data.  The number of countries varies by year, but includes 70 lower 
income countries and other countries that are not necessarily low-income, but have been the 
recipients of U.S. food aid during the periods considered in the study.  The relationship specified 
is as follows: 
FAij = f (PGj, SSj, FPj, PFCj, GNGj, GDPj, WRj, EIij, TGij, PIjz) 
where: j is food aid recipient country, i is the donor country (U.S.); FAij is per capita food aid 
transferred from i to j; PGj is food production growth in country j; SSj is a food production shock 
in country j (one-year shock measured by the percent change of food production in the current 
year relative to the previous year); FPj is the ratio of country j's trade balance to its GDP; PFCj  is 
per capita food consumption in country j (per capita daily calorie consumption); GNGj, is per 
capita income growth in country j; GNPj is per capita income in country j; WRj is a dummy 
variable representing the presence of civil strife or a post-war situation leading to an emergency 
condition in country j; EIij is the donor i's export share in country j's total imports (food and non- 
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food); TGij is the growth in donor i's total exports to country j; PIjz is a set of dummy variables 
illustrating the political ties of the donors to the recipient country.   
 
For the 1990 equation, WR equaled 1 for Nicaragua and Somalia and 0 for the other countries.  
For the 1995 equation, WR equaled 1 for Angola, Bosnia-Herzegovina, Burundi, the Democratic 
Republic of Congo, Haiti, Liberia, Rwanda, Somalia, and Tajikistan and 0 for the other 
countries.  For the 2000 equation, WR equaled 1 for Afghanistan, Eritrea, Ethiopia, Liberia, 
Macedonia, Mozambique, Rwanda, Tajikistan, and Yugoslavia, Federal Republic.  
 
PI represents recipient countries with a close political alliance to the U.S. in different regions of 
the world.  The set PIz contains four dummy variables: PI1 equaled one for countries in North 
Africa and Middle East, PI2 equaled 1 for Latin American countries, PI3 equaled 1 for transition 
economies (former Soviet Union and East European countries), and PI4 equaled one for Asian 
countries.  In the 1990, 1995, and 2000 equations, these political dummies capture the use of 
food aid for U.S. political interests.  The food production index relative to the 5 previous years 
was used to represent PG.  The recipient countries’ per capita income growth (GNG) represents 
per capita income growth from 1985-90, 1990-95, and 1995-2000 for the three periods of 
estimations respectively.  U.S. export growth to the recipient countries (TG) represents trend 
growth values from 1985-90, 1990-95, and 1995-2000 respectively. All other variables are data 
points for 1990, 1995, and 2000.  To reduce the likely correlation between per capita GDP and 
per capita daily calorie consumption (PFC), all PFC data points were divided by 2,100 (the target 
calorie consumption) to represent the severity of the nutritional problem in a country.   
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The last seven variables listed in the equation indicate the donors' humanitarian concerns for the 
food aid recipient countries, while the first three variables represent the donors' political and/or 
economic interests. We expect the results to show food aid allocation (FA) to be negatively 
related to a recipient country's SS (production shock), PFC (per capita food consumption), FP 
(financial pressures), GDP (per capita income), and, positively influenced by PI (providing aid 
for political reasons), WR (aid due to emergency conditions), and EI (economic ties established 
through trade share).  The relationship between food aid (FA) and recipients’ food production 
(PG) and income growth (GNG), and growth in donor’s trade (TG) is not clear.  A positive 
relationship between FA and PG and GNG indicates the donor's support for countries that had 
some production or economic growth success and a negative means that food aid was used to 
assist countries with poor production and economic performance.  A negative relationship 
between FA and TG indicates the use of food aid to stimulate trade and reverse a negative trend 
and a positive sign signifies the use of food aid to promote and reinforce market development.   
 
Motivation Results—The preliminary results show that food aid allocations were not based 
solely on U.S. political and economic interests.  Humanitarian concerns and recipients' economic 
conditions also influenced the allocations.  However, the factors affecting food aid distributions 
among developing countries varied depending on the time period being examined (table 1).    
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Table 1- Estimated Results of U.S. Food Aid Motivation
1990 1995 2000
Coefficients t Stat Coefficients t Stat Coefficients t Stat
Intercept 10.12 0.55 16.57 2.17 4.75 0.80
Political interest: (PI1)* 16.32 1.72 3.75 0.72 19.58 3.97
                         (PI2)* 10.43 1.65 -2.27 -0.62 9.80 2.32
                         (PI3)* 19.54 1.46 10.71 3.49 3.70 1.00
                         (PI4)* -0.47 -0.08 0.21 0.07 0.83 0.26
U.S. exp. share (EI) 0.21 1.83 0.15 2.48 -0.12 -1.47
U.S. exp. growth (TG) 0.00 -0.25 0.00 0.22 -0.01 -0.49
War (WR) 16.00 1.27 4.87 1.56 11.98 3.83
Ext. bal % GDP (FP) -0.20 -1.62 -0.13 -2.03 -0.20 -2.66
Per cap calories (PFC) -3.44 -0.23 -18.95 -2.86 0.13 0.03
Per cap GDP (GDP) 0.00 0.45 0.00 0.91 0.00 0.38
GDP growth (GNG) -0.14 -0.50 0.05 0.37 -0.01 -0.03
Ag prod. growth (PG) -0.07 -0.68 0.03 0.63 -0.03 -0.72
Prod. shocks (SS) 0.29 1.59 0.16 2.03 0.09 1.08
R Square 0.34 0.41 0.42
No. of observations 79 84 82
* PI1 represents a dummy for North Africa and Middle East, PI2 is Latin America,  
PI3 is one of the transition economies, and PI4 is Asia.  
The explanatory variables (R square) were stronger in 2000 and 1995 than in 1990, accounting 
for 42 percent, 41 percent and 34 percent respectively of food aid allocations.  U.S. political 
interests were positive and significant at least for one region in all three time periods.  For the 
Asian region, however, this dummy variable was not significant for any of the 3 time periods.   
Dummies capturing U.S. political interests were significant for Latin American and North 
African and Middle East countries in the 1990 and 2000 equations.  The transition economies 
received significant quantities of food aid in 1995 and the dummy variables representing U.S. 
political interests were significant at this time.  It appears that the breakup of the Soviet Union 
created a new political interest which drew attention away from Latin America and North Africa 
and the Middle East.  By 2000, with economic recovery and political stability in the transition 
countries, the focus of U.S. political interest was shifted back to Latin America and North Africa 
and Middle East. The trade interests that are measured by U.S. export shares had positive signs  
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and were significant in 1990 and 1995, while U.S. export growth did not have any significant 
impact on food aid distribution decisions.  
 
Among the seven variables representing the needs of countries, political strife or existence of a 
post-emergency situation was a significant factor in food aid allocation decisions in 1995 and 
2000.  Another factor that significantly influenced the food aid allocation decisions was the 
financial vulnerability of the countries—significant in all three equations.  Production shocks 
were a significant factor in 1990 and 1995.   Of the other “need” variables, nutritional 
consideration was only significant in 1995.  Income, income growth, and agricultural production 
growth did not have significant impacts and their signs did not have any consistent pattern.   
   
Recipients' Needs Relationship—The above results show that trade and political interests 
influence U.S. decisions on the allocation of food aid.  While needy countries may be recipients 
of food aid, humanitarian factors are not considered the primary determinant.  To more precisely 
quantify the U.S. consideration of recipients’ needs, we estimated food aid allocated among 
developing countries as a function of the “need” variables only (the same variables included in 
the earlier equations) and the estimated results are shown in table 2. 
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Table 2- Estimated Results of U.S. Food Aid Response to Needs
1990 1995 2000
Coefficients t Stat Coefficients t Stat Coefficients t Stat
War (WR) 13.95 1.66 7.12 1.58 11.70 3.27
Ext.bal%GDP (FP) -0.19 -1.32 -0.28 -3.17 -0.26 -3.09
Per cap calories (PFC) 27.36 2.07 7.49 0.87 6.69 1.35
Per cap GDP (GDP) 0.00 0.24 0.00 0.43 0.00 1.43
GDP growth (GNG) -0.47 -1.44 0.01 0.04 0.07 0.26
Ag prod. growth (PG) 0.01 0.09 -0.07 -1.24 -0.02 -0.58
Prod. shocks (SS) 0.27 1.30 0.17 1.54 0.10 1.04
R Square 0.15 0.19 0.29  
 
Need Results—The variables relating to recipients' needs explained less of the relationship 
between food aid allocation and need factors than when economic and political variables were 
included.  The “need” variables explained 15 to 29 percent of the food aid allocations over the 
study period but the trend was positive—meaning that variables’ explanatory power grew over 
time. 
 
Food aid allocations responded to political problems of the countries in all three periods and this 
variable’s significance grew over time.  The coefficient of the per capita calorie index was 
significant in 1990, but its sign was unexpected (positive).  In 1995, three of the nine of the need 
variables--political unrest, constraint in balance of payments, and production shocks--were 
significant with the expected signs.  In 2000, only political unrest and constraints in balance of 
payments were significant with the expected signs.  
 
Evaluation of the Overall Results—In general, a mix of political interests, trade interests, and 
humanitarian concerns continue to shape U.S. food aid policies.  The increase in the overall 
explanatory power (R square) of the complete variable set over the three time periods and  
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insignificant impact of U.S. trade interests in 2000 could be interpreted as a lessening of the 
traditional trade interest.  However, political interests remain strong in U.S. food aid distribution 
policy.  The explanatory power of the “need” variables remains weak.  This, in part, could be the 
result of the growing number of activities under the food aid programs such that it is difficult to 
measure their cumulative impact.  Table 3 shows the number of activities under the food aid 
program.   
Table 3--U.S. Food Aid is Spreading Thin
Number of activities Total
emergency project program total food aid
aid aid aid
---number--- 1,000 tons
1990 98 324 69 491 7,599
1995 235 208 44 487 4,004
2000 311 257 45 613 6,646
Source: World Food Program, ERS calculations.  
These activities are grouped as emergency aid (during and after emergencies), project aid 
(development projects such as food for work activities), and program aid (mainly government to 
government aid).  As the data show, U.S. food aid is spread thin. The number of activities under 
the food aid program increased 25 percent from 1990 to 2000 while the quantity of food aid 
declined 13 percent.  With the growing political instability since 1990, there has been a major 
shift in the allocation of food aid away from program aid to emergency aid.  In 1990, 76 percent 
of food aid fell under program aid; this declined to 36 percent in 2000 (table 4).    
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Table 4--U.S. Emergency Food Aid Increases Over Time
Emergency Project Program Total food aid
aid aid aid 1,000 tons
---1,000 tons---
1990 629 1,182 5,787 7,599
1995 1,498 978 1,528 4,004
2000 2,635 1,634 2,378 6,646
Source: World Food Program, ERS calculations.  
In contrast, the number of emergency aid activities increased more than 3-fold in 10 years. The 
number of project activities declined during 1990-2000, but their share in total food aid increased 
from 13 to 25 percent.  Despite the growth in this share, project aid per activity is small, on 
average, relative to other activities (table 5).   
Table 5--Total Food Aid per Average Activity Declined by 30 Percent
Average food aid amount per activity in
emergency aid project aid program aid total
---1,000 tons---
1990 6.4 3.6 83.9 15.5
1995 6.4 4.7 34.7 8.2
2000 8.5 6.4 52.8 10.8
Source: World Food Program, ERS calculations.  
Overall, the growing number of food-aid-related activities and the decline in the quantities could 
mean more targeted activities but it also could result in growing administrative costs. 
 
Increasing Demand for Food Aid Requires Clear Policy Focus     
The global quantity of food aid has fluctuated through time and its share has declined relative to 
both total exports of food aid donors and total food imports of low-income countries.  The 
decline in the level of U.S. food aid since its inception is not likely to reverse itself and it is  
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possible that even the current level cannot be maintained.  As major donor nations reduce market 
support to agriculture in compliance with their commitments to WTO, their surplus food 
production is likely to decline and as a result the costs of supplying food aid may increase.   
 
At the same time as supplies of food aid have declined, the gap between domestic production and 
consumption in many low-income countries, and thus the demand for food aid, has increased.  
This has been driven by many factors including slow growth of domestic food production and 
lagging purchasing power in countries with inadequate resources, as well as a rapidly growing 
number of instances of political instability.  According to the latest ERS estimate, the gap 
between the nutritional targets and purchasing power of the populations within the countries (a 
set of 70 low-income countries) was more than 32 million tons in 2003 (Food Security 
Assessment Report, USDA-ERS, GFA 15, May 04).  This was nearly 4 times larger than the 
supply of food aid in 2002 (most recent year this data is available).  While this gap is projected to 
decline to less than 28 million tons during the next decade, it will likely remain far above the 
level of available food aid.  According to the World Bank, about 1 billion people in developing 
countries live in poverty with per capita incomes of less than $370.  In some regions, particularly 
Sub-Saharan Africa, per capita food consumption has declined in the last 2 decades, while food 
aid shipments to the region have not changed since the late 1980s.  For these countries, further 
declines in food consumption, from already low levels, can lead to severe food shortages and 
political instability.   
 
These estimates, however, do not necessarily mean that food aid has to increase to meet these 
gaps because the absorption of such large quantities of food imports, given the poor distribution  
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system of these countries, would be difficult, if not impossible.  Nevertheless, one can conclude 
that extra care needs to be applied in food aid distribution policies to increase its effectiveness if 
hunger is to be reduced drastically by the next decade.  There are many unresolved questions 
related to the impacts and the role of food aid.  Unfortunately, despite the length of the program, 
food aid’s accomplishments remain murky and that could jeopardize its future (USDA-ERS, 
Food Security Assessment Report, GFA 15, May 04).   
  
Summary and Conclusions 
The preliminary results of the paper show that food aid distribution is based not only on U.S. 
political and trade interests but also on the recipient countries' economic conditions.  For 
example, at least one of the variables measuring “needs” was significant in each time period.  
Among the variables representing direct U.S. political and economic interests either the political 
relationship (PI) or trade interests (EI) were significant in all equations.  The positive 
relationship between the trade interest and political interest variables and food aid transfers is not 
unusual.  Any international transfer of a resource must have the domestic support of interested 
political groups.  Eliminating the donors' political and economic interests in food aid could 
substantially reduce the program.  
 
The estimation results indicate greater consideration of the recipients' needs in U.S. food aid 
transfers over time as shown by the growing R Square of the needs equations.  This is a very 
important trend because the United States is the largest contributor of food aid, providing over 
half of the total. The increasing importance of the “needs” criteria in U.S. food aid allocation  
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decisions is a trend that will likely influence the actions of other donors.  The decline in the share 
of program food aid and the fact that none of the two variables that represent U.S. trade interests 
were significant in the 2000 equation are indications of a decline in the role of the U.S. trade 
interests in the allocation of food aid.  This is important because of the WTO-related concerns 
that the U.S. exerts trade interests in providing food aid and those are often associated with 
program aid.  The growing number of activities under food aid, however, can make measuring its 
accomplishments more difficult, not to mention the associated growing administrative costs for 
both the U.S. and recipient countries. 
 
The U.S. Action Plan on Food Security, released in March 1999, outlines policies and actions, 
placing priority on the most food insecure countries.  It is too early to evaluate the impacts of this 
policy change.  However, the fact that the plan calls for developing transparent methods to 
monitor the impact of food aid in reducing hunger of the recipients is clearly an important step 
toward streamlining and targeting the U.S. food aid program. 
 